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Article 3

STUDENT ARTICLES
Ticket Scalping: Same Old Problem with a
Brand New Twist
Jonathan Bell*
To many people, Sunday, October 16, 2005, was just another
day of the year. For diehard Chicago White Sox baseball fans, it went
down as the day which ended forty-six years of agony and frustration.
Shortly after 11 p.m. central standard time, Paul Konerko stepped on
first base, ending the baseball game and sending the Chicago White
Sox to the World Series for the first time since 1959.1 This was the
first time that any Chicago baseball team had made it to the World
Series since 1959.2 While more than half of the Second City rejoiced,
the real battle was about to begin. Winning the World Series was one
issue. Getting a ticket to witness what many fans had waited their
whole lives to see was a completely different ballgame. Ticket
demand for the World Series was high, and ticket brokers and
scalpers salivated at the prospects of making a fortune off of
Chicago's newfound4 success. 3 The White Sox publicly stated that
"several thousands", of tickets would be made available to the public,
* J.D. candidate, May 2007, Loyola University Chicago School of Law;
Bachelor of Arts in History and Political Science, 2002, University of WisconsinMadison; Lifelong diehard White Sox fan who watched all four games of the 2005
World Series on television.
1 Rick Morrissey, America, Here Come the Sox, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2005, at
CN3.
The Chicago Cubs, the other Chicago baseball team, has not played in a
World Series since 1945. Dave Van Dyck, Ringing Out the Old, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
15, 2006, at C8.
3 Jessica E. Vascellaro, Scalping World Series Tickets Gets Easier, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 20, 2005, at D1.
4 Brendan McCarthy, Tonya Maxwell & James Janega, The Golden Ticket:
They Sold Out in 18 Minutes, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 2005, at C1. The White Sox
2
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however, they never explicitly confirmed the exact number of tickets
being released.5 Additionally, they never emphasized whether these
"thousands" of tickets were being made available for each game or
for the four possible home games combined.6 As a result, the vast
majority of seats were reserved for season ticket holders, Major
League Baseball affiliates, and others.? .
The White Sox proved to be the hottest ticket in town. The
few World Series tickets released for the four home games 8 went on
sale to the public at noon through Ticketmaster 9 on October 18, 2005,
and sold out within eighteen minutes.' 0 Thus, for many fans, some of
whom were not even alive to witness a Chicago baseball team
playing in a World Series, to see a game meant shelling out hundreds,
even thousands of dollars per ticket to ticket brokers and scalpers
sold their tickets exclusively by telephone and online and not at the box office. Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. As of the 2005 baseball season, U.S. Cellular Field, the White Sox
stadium, held a seating capacity of 40,615. Adam Zoll, et al., CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19,
2006, at C8.
7 ABC News, Hottest Tickets in Town: World Series Sold Out
in Minutes, Oct.
18, 2005, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=local&id=3546603. Because of
the anticipated high demand of World Series tickets, the White Sox capitalized by
marketing packages for season tickets for the following season with the premise
that some who signed up before the end of the playoffs could secure World Series
tickets. Tribune Staff Reporter, Need Tickets?, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 2005, at CI.
Yet not everybody was happy. While a great premise to sell season tickets, not all
fans who ordered were able to secure seats for the World Series. Jon Yates, Many
Sox Fans Strike Out; Season-Ticket Offer Did Not Ensure Series Seat, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 21, 2005, at C3.
8 Yates, supra note 7. Only two of the four home games were guaranteed to be
played. In baseball, the league that wins the All-Star game is awarded home field
advantage in the World Series. Press Release, Major League Baseball, World Series
Advantage to be Awarded to All-Star Winner (Jan.16, 2003) (on file with author).
Because the American League won the 2005 All-Star game, the White Sox got to
play the first two games of the best of seven series at home before heading on the
road to Houston for at most the next three games. If, by the end of the fifth game
neither team had won four, the series would have returned to Chicago for the final
two games.

9 Ticketmaster,
About
Ticketmaster,
http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/
aboutus.html?tmlink=tmhome i abouttm (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
Ticketmaster is the world's largest on-line ticket company, with about 3,300 retail
location outlets and 19 telephone conference centers throughout the world. Id. It
services more than 9,000 clients worldwide for a variety of entertainment and
sporting events. Id.
'0 Vascellaro, supra note 3.
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alike. "
As is typical when a high profile event is in such high
demand, obtaining a ticket to the World Series proved to be a
lose/lose situation for average consumers. They could either spend a
large sum of money with the potential of getting a glimpse of
Chicago history, or, they could save their money, which in turn
would force them to watch their favorite team on television instead of
at the ballpark.
This article will provide a general overview of the ticket
scalping industry and the effect that the existence of ticket scalping
has had both on event promoters as well as the paying consumers. It
will address the legislative reaction to ticket scalping as well as the
changing judicial responses to such laws, specifically looking at
Illinois legislative measures in this industry. Next, the article will
look at how some promoters have directly entered the secondary
market in terms of reselling their own product for a higher price,
changing the ticket scalping landscape. Finally, the article will look
to see what solutions may be available to further control ticket
scalping and the effect that such measures might have on the scalping
industry.
I.

Ticket Scalping: A Basic Overview

Ticket scalping is broadly defined as the reselling of tickets to
entertainment or sporting events at some price dictated by the
marketplace.' 2 Typically, the practice is associated with reselling
tickets at a price higher than face value; the dollar amount printed on
the face of the ticket and the price of the ticket as sold at the box
office. 13 In the vast majority of situations, the tickets are for
entertainment events held on a specific date, at a stated time, and in a

" Id. Ticketmaster sold World Series tickets ranging from $125 and $185.
McCarthy, et al., supra note 4. Yet online ticket sales skyrocketed. Id.
Stubhub.com, an online ticket broker, reported selling two premium tickets for
$7,500 each and offering tickets in the upper deck of U.S. Cellular Field for a
minimum of $515. Id. The last time a Chicago baseball team had won the World
Series prior to this past season, was in 1917. Van Dyck, supra note 2. This in turn
drove the demand for tickets even higher.
12 Thomas A. Diamond, Ticket Scalping: A New Look at an Old Problem, 37
U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 71 (1982).
13 Daniel J. Glantz, For-BidScalping Online?: Anti-Scalping Legislation in an
InternetSociety, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 261, 262 (2005).
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venue with a fixed seating capacity.' 4 Promoters, the persons hosting
the event, must usually sell tickets in advance of the event with the
price of the ticket printed directly on the face of the ticket.' 5 The
popularity of the event dictates
whether ticket scalping occurs, and, if
16
ticket.
the
of
price
the
so,
The process of ticket scalping begins when the scalper
purchases the tickets, usually in bulk, directly from the promoter of
the event and then waits until the ticket supply is sold out.' 7 The
scalper then offers to resell his or her tickets to consumers at
whatever price the market dictates. 18 This practice creates a
secondary market, whereby the consumer purchases directly from the
scalper, or a secondary producer, rather than from the producer.19 The
more popular the event, the higher the demand for tickets, and
consequently the higher the price charged by the scalper.2 °
Ticket scalping is derived in part by the sports and
entertainment industries common practice of selling tickets at prices
below market value. 21 The economic justification behind this practice
is that when the producer sells its goods at lower prices, demand for
the goods will rise, and more of the available supply will be sold.22 In
doing this, the producer is hopeful that consumers will buy up all the

Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, The Folly of Anti-Scalping
Laws, 15 Cato J. 65, 66 (1995), available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/journal/cj 15nl/cj 15nl-4.pdf.
14

15 Id.
16

Id. For the purposes of this article, ticket scalping will be used to reference

both ticket scalping as well as ticket brokers and will be defined solely as the
selling of tickets for a price higher than face value. Because of the nature of ticket
scalping, tickets will usually be resold by scalpers or ticket brokers even if an event
is in low demand or not sold out, but for face value or possibly below face.
17 Diamond, supra note 12, at 72.
18 Id.

Jasmin Yang, A Whole Different Ballgame: Ticket Scalping Legislation and
BehavioralEconomics?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 111, 111 (2004).
20 Diamond, supra note 12, at 73-4.
19

21 Phyllis L. Zankel,
Wanted. Tickets-A Reassessment of Current Ticket
Scalping Legislation and the Controversy Surrounding its Enforcement, 2 SETON
HALL J. SPORTL. 129, 144 (1992).
22 Scott D. Simon, If You Can't Beat 'em, Join 'em: Implications for New
York's Scalping Law in Light of Recent Developments in the Ticket Business, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1176 (2004).

2006]

Ticket Scalping

439

available tickets, resulting in a sell OUt. 23 Usually, the price of the
ticket is far less than the average consumer would be willing to pay
for a ticket, increasing the likelihood of a shortage in tickets. While
a sellout is any promoters' ultimate goal, this practice of underpricing tickets becomes ideal not only for professional ticket scalpers
but also for the disinterested ticket holder willing to sell his or her
tickets. 25 Because many consumers are willing to pay higher than
advertised prices for tickets to high demand events, scalpers can
snatch up premium seats at face value and sell them to the highest
bidder. 2

II.

Nobody's Friend

The secondary ticket market is an exceptionally lucrative
industry.27 Because much of the activity is unreported, actual dollar
figures made from ticket scalping are difficult to attain with actual
certainty.28 However one figure roughly estimated that the scalping
industry cumulatively nets between $2 and $14 billion annually.2
This is somewhat surprising, considering the fact that as of 2005,
twenty-nine states had enacted statutes regulating the resale of
entertainment tickets.3 0 By comparison, Ticketmaster, the world's
largest primary ticket seller,3 ' sold 119 million tickets valued at $6
23

Id.

24

id.

Id. The ticket scalper often steps in as a middle man between the lowvaluing ticket holder and the high-valuing ticket buyer. Id. The ticket scalper will
pay the original ticket holder a price above face value and then sell to the buyer at
an even higher price, creating a profit for both. Id.
26 Robert E. Freeman & Daniel Gati, Internet Ticket Scalping: If You Can't
Beat 'em, Join 'em, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 6, 6 (2003).
27 Simon, supra note 22, at 1172.
25

28

id.

Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, CreatingA Futures Market
for Major Ticket Events: Problems and Prospects, 21 Cato J. 443, 449 (citing
estimates made by TicketAmerica in 1998, EventTixx in 2000, and LiquidSeats in
2001. The companies made different assumptions as to the percentage of tickets
that brokers would resell to the secondary ticket market).
30 Id. at 445. See infra Part III for a discussion of ticket scalping legislation.
29

Ticketmaster, About Ticketmaster, supra note 9. As a primary ticket seller,
Ticketmaster does its sales through pre-arranged prices between the producer and
consumer. The majority of its profits, therefore, come from service and handling
31
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32
billion
Thus,
it should and
come
as no surprise
scalpers inare2005.
despised
by consumers
producers
alike. 33 that ticket

a. Consumers' Worst Enemy
For consumers, ticket scalpers represent those who exhaust
the box office supply, thereby taking away tickets that the consumer
could have purchased and then selling them at prices far higher than
what the average customer can afford or is willing to pay. 34 Fans also
resent the fact that ticket scalpers are most prevalent during high
profile events such as playoff games, opening nights, and weekend
35
events, making it more costly than normal to see a popular event.
Furthermore, the threat always exists of fans purchasing counterfeit
tickets from ticket scalpers, thereby losing both money3 6as well as the
opportunity to see the event firsthand at the same time.
However even in a scalping-free world, all fans who wished
to attend a specific event would not be able to as producers can only
permit so many individuals in a certain venue. Additionally, the fact
exists that promoters often withhold at least one-fourth of the tickets
from the box office to accommodate season ticket holders and other
VIPs. 3 7 For example, assume that a certain Broadway theater has a
highly touted play which is debuting on the first Saturday of the
following month. This theater has seating capacity for exactly 4,000
charges. See IAC/Interactive Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Mar. 13,
2006) ("Ticketing revenue is generated primarily through convenience charges and
order processing fees received by Ticketmaster for each ticket sold by Ticketmaster
on behalf of its clients").
32 Ticketmaster, About Ticketmaster, supra note 9.
Doug Pappas, Sell Outs: Major League Baseball Should Tell its Teams to
Stop Scalping their Own Tickets, LEGAL AFF., 20, 20 (2004).
33

34 Id.

Yang, supra note 19, at 112.
36 Happel & Jennings, supra note 14, at 77. Counterfeit tickets are not wholly
impossible to create at a level significant enough to convince the average consumer
that what he or she is buying is a real ticket. Specifically with the increase in
technology, specified marks can be duplicated right onto a ticket. Counterfeit items
themselves are highly illegal and prohibited by both federal and state intellectual
property laws. Colloquy, Sports Law in the State of Wisconsin 15 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 425, 518 (2005).
37 Simon, supra note 22, at 1208. As was the case with the White Sox during
the World Series, this number can rise much higher, perhaps to as high as threefourths of the stadium.
35
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people; however 5,000 Broadway enthusiasts wish to attend opening
night. The theater has 200 season ticket subscribers and wishes to
withhold an additional 800 for critics, families of the performers, and
local politicians. Therefore, only 3,000 tickets can be sold to the
public, meaning at least 2,000 of the enthusiasts will be unable to
witness the opening night performance. The creation of the secondary
market makes it possible for some of these people, the ones who have
the strongest
desire and are willing to pay a higher fee, to attend this
38
event.
Additionally, scalpers also save consumers time and energy in
terms of the effort of getting tickets for popular events through the
box office. 39 The scalper therefore not only increases the likelihood
that the enthusiastic fan can attend the event, but allows that
individual to spare themselves of the frustration often associated with
obtaining a ticket on their own. Furthermore, the consumer retains
some control with the amount of money spent to see certain events.
While in the days leading up to a certain event the price for a ticket
remains high, as the event nears, the price of the ticket drops,
sometimes even below4 1face value so that the scalpers do not risk
losing their investment.
b. Promoters' Big Headache
Event promoters have a similar distaste towards ticket
scalpers. Promoters dislike scalpers who snatch up their tickets and
then capitalize off their product, sometimes in close proximity to the
event, annoying customers who have already paid, and creating a
negative atmosphere in and around the venue.42 Additionally, as
many scalpers are independent businessmen who deal in cash
transactions only, promoters dislike their profiting without sustaining

38 id.
39 Id.
40 id.

Brad Heath & David Shepardson, As Game Nears, Ticket Costs Drop, THE
Feb.
6, 2006, available at http://www.detnews.com/
DET.
NEWS,
(last
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060205/SPORTS0106/602050394/1365/rss35.
visited Apr. 14, 2006). Tickets for the 2006 Super Bowl were at one point selling
for as much as $4,000. Id. By the Saturday before the game, the price on those
seats had dropped to as low as $2,500 and plenty of seats remained on game day,
with the price dropping as kickoff got closer. Id.
42 Freeman & Gati, supra note 26, at 6.
41
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any tax ramifications.43 Furthermore, this secondary marketplace
creates tension and distrust among consumers of the producers. 44
Although the producer may dislike the presence of the scalpers as
much as, if not more than the consumer, the high price of admission
that consumers are required to pay to the scalper in turn reflects,
however unfairly, on the producer sponsoring the event.45
Yet the presence of ticket scalpers does provide promoters
with some important benefits. First of all, any ticket purchased by
scalpers is guaranteed revenue for the promoter. 46 The more tickets
sold increases the chances for a sellout, the ultimate goal for any
producer.47 The perception of a sellout in actuality enhances the
popularity for consumers and attracts some into the marketplace who
otherwise would not attend.48 Second, the more consumers in
attendance allows the producer to maximize revenue from additional
sources, namely parking, refreshments, and souvenir sales.4 9
Perhaps surprisingly, one recent development in the ticket
scalping industry is that many promoters have indirectly entered the
secondar ticket market in order to make a greater profit off of their
product. This seems surprising especially when considering the fact
that this practice directly contradicts their traditional stance on ticket
scalping. Perhaps it is that promoters disdain others who profit off of
their product in this manner, but see no problems with doing so
themselves. 5 '

43

id.

44 Diamond, supra note 12, at 73. The exhaustion of box office supply
combined with the scalper with an abundant supply leads to accusations of fraud,
complicity, and collusion by the consumer against the promoter. Id.
45 id.
46

Simon, supra note 22, at 1210.

47 Happel & Jennings, supra note 14, at 66.
48 id.
49 Brian M. Pukier, Exiled on Main Street: A Ticket Scalper's Dilemma, 50 U.

TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 280, 291 (1992).
50 Pappas, supra note 33, at 20.
51 See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of this aspect of ticket scalping.
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III. Legislative v. Judiciary: Scalping Laws and the

Judicial Responses
State legislators, in reaction to the negative connotation
associated with ticket scalping, have been passing laws outlawing or
restricting ticket scalping for over 100 years. 52 These laws vary from
state to state. The majority of state statutes permit the practice in
some form, such as regulating where tickets can be resold,53 limiting
who can engage in the business, and capping the amount above face
value that one is permitted to sell.54 Other states strictly prohibit
ticket scalping altogether. 55 For example, under New Jersey law, a
scalper may resell a ticket, but for no more than $3.00 or twenty
percent of the ticket price, whichever is greater. 56 In Maryland, ticket
scalping, legislation is only applicable to boxing or kickboxing
events.
Judicial reactions to these laws have varied over time. Early
challengers to such statutes prevailed as laws were often struck down
as violations of liberty interests and property rights.58 Ticket scalping
was considered a private industry, and therefore the courts held that
state legislatures were overreaching their boundaries by regulating in
that area, thereby invalidating many regulations an "impermissible

52 Matthew Siporin, Cavoto v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc.: Chicago
Cubs Ticket Scalping Scandal and the Relationship Between Separate Corporate
Entities Owned by a Common Parent,2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J., 723, 724
(2004). This article specifically looks at Illinois's first response to ticket scalping
in 1907. See infra Part III.A for an analysis of the Illinois law.

53 ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3718 (2005). Arizona prohibits selling tickets
above

face value within 200 feet of an entrance to an event and additionally requires
written permission from the promoter. Id.
54 Yang, supra note 19, at 11. As stated above, as of 2005, twenty-nine states
had enacted laws that restricted ticket scalping in some way and many
municipalities have some type of ordinance in effect. Happel and Jennings, supra
note 14, at 66. See also Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Ticket Resale Laws,
available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/ticketscalplaws.htm (last visited Apr.
16, 2006) (summarizing state ticket resale statutes).
55 FLA. STAT. ANN.
56

§ 817.361 (2006).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-33 (2006).

57 MD. CODE ANN.,

Bus. REG. § 4-318 (2006). See also Nat'l Conference of
State Legislatures, supra note 54.
58 Zankel, supra note 21, at 129.
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stretch of state police power." 59 This era, historically referred to as
the "Lochner" 60 era, was dominated by courts actively scrutinizing
state legislation and striking economic laws down as unconstitutional
violations of the due process clauses of both the6 Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. '
In 1927 the United States Supreme Court struck down a New
York law which prohibited the resale of any ticket for more than fifty
cents above face value. 62 A ticket broker who sold nearly 300,000
tickets annually brought suit seeking a judicial declaration that the
price regulation in the statute was unconstitutional.63 The Court held
that the state's police power in such areas, aside from emergencies,
existed only in situations in which "the business or the property
involved has become 'affected with a public interest."' 64 The Court
held that ticket scalping was not an area of public interest and
law invaded both the rights of property and the
determined that the 65
freedom of contract.
State courts followed the Supreme Court's lead in striking
down their own legislatures' laws. 66 In Kirtley v. State of Indiana,the
Supreme Court of Indiana struck down a state statute that prohibited
the resale of tickets at a price either greater or less than the price on
59 id.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The United States Supreme
Court struck down a New York law restricting the number of hours that a worker in
a bakery could work in a given week because it affected a private industry and did
not promote the health, safety, and morals of the people of the state and was
therefore a violation of state police powers. Id. at 57. Legal historians refer to the
Lochner-era as notorious for the Supreme Court's practice of laissez-faire
constitutionalism, in which most legislation, state or federal, was struck down as
unconstitutional when it disrupted the natural laws of economics. Simon, supra
note 22, at 1192.
61 Zankel supra note 21, at 130.
60

62

Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 437

(1927). It should be noted that three years earlier, the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a different New York Scalping Law that prohibited reselling
tickets without a license. Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319, 323 (1925). In
Weller, the Court held that a distinction existed between requiring a license and
limiting a resale price and found that the legislature was justified in enacting the
law. Id. at 325.
63

Tyson, 273 U.S. at 420.

64 Id. at 428.
65 Id. at 431.
66

Kirtley v. State, 84 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. 1949).
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the face of the ticket. 67 The defendant was charged with soliciting
tickets for an Indiana High School Basketball game at a price twentyfive dollars greater than the price of the three dollar ticket.68 The
court held that the right to pursue a proper occupation was an
"unalienable right and a privilege not to be restricted except perhaps
by a proper exercise of the police power of the state." 69 The court
further reasoned that the statute had no relation to the protection of
the public's health, safety, and morals, and therefore was an improper
use of state police power.
The Supreme Court first signaled an end to the
Lochnerization method of invalidating state and federal laws in 1934,
and developed a different approach for analyzing state economic
regulations. In Nebbia v. New York, the Court upheld a New York
statute that fixed the selling price of milk as a valid exercise of state's
police power. 72 The Court acknowledged that the phrase "affected
with a public interest" was tantamount to the idea of police powers
and a statute regulating the use or the price of the use of ones
property is not necessarily a violation of due process.73 In upholding
the law, the Court declared that the democratically elected state
legislatures are free to adopt whatever economic policy they deem
necessa 774 so long as it is reasonably related to promoting the public
welfare.
Because Nebbia concerned the constitutionality of price
regulations, there was no reason to believe that this new approach
laid out by the Supreme Court would not apply to cases involving
ticket scalping legislation. Indeed, in Gold v. DiCarlo,75 the Southern
District of New York upheld a New York anti-scalping statute
restricting the resale of a ticket for more than $1.50 above face value
as a valid exercise of state police power and not, as the Supreme
Court had done in Tyson, as an unconstitutional violation of the due
67

Id. at 713.

68 Id.
69

Id. at 714.

70

Id. at 715.

7' Nebbia
72

v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Id. at 558-59.

71

Id. at 533.

74

Id. at 538.

75

Gold v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

446

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 18:4

process clause.7 6

The New York legislature enacted the statute to protect the
77
"fraud, extortion, exorbitant rates and similar abuses."
from
public
The court stated that for such a law to be upheld, the regulation must
bear a rational relation to a legitimate, constitutionally permissive
objective.7 8 The court also made clear that the days of using".., the
due process clause as a weapon 'to strike down state laws, regulatory
of business ... conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,

or out of harmony with a particular school of thought..."' were over
and that they would be most deferential to the determinations of the
states'

elected

legislative

officials.

79

In

declaring

the

law

constitutional, the court held that regulating resale prices was a
matter of public interest because it affected the price that the public
was forced
to pay, thereby making it a proper exercise of state police
80
power.
State judiciaries have followed the federal model, upholding
various state-enacted anti-scalping laws as a proper exercise of
legislative power. 81 The majority of challengers argue that the laws
are unconstitutional, violating due process, and interfering with
private property rights.8 2 To date, since the Nebbia approach changed
the landscape of these lines of cases, no such challenge has
prevailed.83
a. Illinois Legislation and Judicial Response
Illinois' first ticket scalping law, enacted in 1907, outlawed
the sale of tickets above face value for "theaters, circuses, and places
of amusement." 84 This law, however, was short lived.8 5 In People v.
76

Id. at 819.

77

Id. at 818.

78

Id. at 820.

79
80

Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,488 (1955)).
Gold, 235 F. Supp. at 820.

81

Freeman & Gati, supra note 26, at 6.

82

Id. (citing State v. Spann, 623 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn. 1981); NJ Assoc. of

Ticket Brokers v. Tickertron, Div. of Control Data Corp., 543 A.2d 997 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); State v. Trabucchi, 408 N.W.2d 563 (Mich. Ct. App.

1987)).
83 Id. at 7.
84

Siporin, supra note 52, at 724-25.
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Steele, the plaintiffs were charged and convicted of violating the
86
statute for selling theater tickets at a price higher than face value.
The plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violation of due process,
specifically a violation of freedom of contract in carrying on a lawful
business of selling theater tickets. 87 The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed, striking down the statute as an unconstitutional violation of
the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution. 8 The court
acknowledged that the legislature had general police powers to
regulate and even interfere with a private industry insofar as the
health, safety, and general welfare of the public required.89 Yet the
court determined that the sale of tickets at a price higher than face
value was neither immoral nor injurious to the public, and legislation
prohibiting this was both arbitrary and an unreasonable interference
to the individuals affected. 90
Shortly after Steele, the city of Chicago enacted a city
ordinance that permitted ticket scalping, but prohibited alliances
between promoters and ticket scalpers. 91 Not surprisingly, this statute
was almost immediately challenged as an unconstitutional violation
of due process rights by theater owners who formed collusive
agreements with ticket scalpers in order to share in some of their
profit. 92 The statute's purpose was to protect the public consumers
from paying higher prices from scalpers falsely disguised as
independent proprietors when in reality they were acting as a part of a
greater scheme on behalf of the promoter. 93 The theater owners
argued that the intent of the legislation was not to prevent
misrepresentation,
but to destroy the business of ticket scalping
94
altogether.

The Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed with the theater
85

People v. Steele, 83 N.E. 236, 240 (Ill. 1907).

86

Id. at 236.

87

Id. at 237.

88

Id. at 240.

89

Id. at 237.

90

Steele, 83 N.E. at 238-40.

91

Siporin, supra note 52, at 725.

92

People ex rel. The Cort Theater Co. v. Thompson, 119 N.E. 41, 42 (11.

1918).
93

Id. at 42-3.

94 Id. at 44.
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owners, upholding the ordinance as a lawful exercise of police
powers.95 The court recognized that a place of public entertainment,
such as a theater, was very much entrenched with public interest and
therefore subject to regulation to some extent. 96 Protecting the public
from falsification and misrepresentation was certainly a legitimate
purpose, and the court made clear that the legislation did nothing to
destroy the industry of ticket scalping; the consumer retained the
right to purchase either from a scalper or directly from the box
office.97 The law simply prevented
98 the scalper and the promoter from
entering into private agreements.
It is interesting to note, especially considering the timing of
this case, that the Thompson court declared the Chicago ordinance as
a lawful exercise of police powers. This case was decided in 1918,
more than fifteen years before the Supreme Court's decision in
Nebbia signaling an end to the Lochner-era. Yet in Thompson, the
statute at issue did not interfere with the private industry to the extent
that the statute did in Steele. In Thompson, the court upheld the
statute that simply restricted interaction between the promoters and
scalpers. 99 It did not 00
regulate price restrictions or prohibit a private
enterprise altogether.1
After the Supreme Court's decision in Nebbia, the Illinois
state legislature followed suit, passing a statute which regulated ticket
sales to different amusement events.' 0 In 1935, the legislature
amended the Ticket Scalping Act of 1923 by adding Section 1.5,
which prohibited the sale of such tickets at a price above
face value
of the Act.' 0 2
and mandated a $5,000 fine for a violation
This statute was virtually identical to the one enacted and
immediately struck down as unconstitutional in 1907.103 Yet, this was
a different era. By 1974, when the statute was challenged as an
unconstitutional violation of protected due process rights in People v.

95 Id. at 45-6.
96

Id. at 45.

97 Thompson, 119 N.E. at 45-6.
98 Id. at 46.
99 Id. at 45-6.
00 Id. at 44.

'01 Siporin, supra note 52, at 727.
102

Id. at 728; People v. Patton, 309 N.E.2d 572, 573 (Ill. 1974).

103

Patton, 309 N.E.2d at 575.
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Patton, it was a virtual lock that the Illinois Supreme Court would
uphold the law as a valid exercise of police powers. Indeed the court
in Patton upheld the law, holding, in accordance with the federal
courts' holdings in Nebbia and Gold, that the test in determining the
constitutionality of a statute is whether the legislative objective is
reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose.' 0 4 In
explicitly overturning Steele, the court deferred to the legislature
and
5
found that it was acting pursuant to its legislative powers.-1
b. Illinois Today
The Illinois Ticket Scalping Act of 1923 remained effective
until 1991 when the Illinois legislature affirmatively legalized ticket
brokering in some situations. 106 The legislature acted primarily in
response to a 1991 case in which the Illinois Supreme Court once
again upheld the Act as a constitutional exercise of legislative
powers. 107 This change in the law was not a completely surprising
turn of events. After the court's decision in Patton, the legislature had
amended the Act in 1978, permitting a reasonable service charge to
be added on top of the price listed on the face of the ticket.' 0 8 Thus,
the legislature opened the door for greater changes, ultimately
permitting ticket scalping under certain circumstances.
The broad overarching Illinois Ticket Sale and Resale Act'0 9
makes it unlawful for any person or corporation, regardless of their
title, to sell admission tickets at any place other than the box office
for a price higher than stated on the face of the ticket.'10 It also
permits the promoter of the ticket to sell at a location outside of the
box office so long as it sells at the same price as advertised."'
However, Section 1.5 of the Act lays out four explicit, statutory
104

Id. at 574.

105 Id. at 575.
106

See generally Ticket Sale & Resale Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375 (2005).

107

People v. Waisvisz, 582 N.E.2d 1383 (11.

1991).

In Waisvisz, the

defendant was charged, convicted, and fined $3000 for selling two $25 New Kids
on the Block concert tickets, for $40 each, outside of Assembly Hall, the venue for
the show at the University of Illinois. Id. at 1384-85.
108

Siporin, supra note 52, at 729.

109 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
110 Id.
111 Id.

375/1(a).
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exceptions as to when
the sale of tickets at a price higher than face
12
value is permitted."
First, subsection (b) permits a registered" l 3 ticket broker to
sell tickets above face value so long as the broker engages in the
resale of tickets on a regular and ongoing basis from a fixed location
within the state. 1 4 This exception does not permit the broker to stand
nearby the venue and sell tickets above face value on the day of the
event, although they may do so with the direct permission of the
promoter. 115 The second exception permits a registered' 16 Internet
auction listing service engaged in both interstate and intrastate
commerce to sell tickets above face value, however requires that the
operator of the web site be in compliance with all applicable laws
regarding ticket sales."l 7 This subsection also requires certain
consumer protection measures such as a standard refund policy and

112

Id. § 375/1.5. First of all, it should be noted that the statute does not put a

cap on the amount above face value that these tickets may be sold. Second, Illinois
only recently removed its ban on Internet auction web sites allowing more than just
the licensed broker to sell tickets above face value. See Vascellaro, supra note 3.
113 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 375/1.5(b)(1).
The ticket broker must be duly
registered with the Office of the Secretary of State. Id.
114 Id. § 375/1.5(b).
115 Id. § 375/1.5(b)(3). A ticket broker who owns or rents property near the
venue may sell tickets at that location regardless of whether or not they have the
promoters permission. Id.
116 Id. § 375/1.5(c).
The Internet auction listing service must be duly
registered with "the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation under the
Auction License Act and with the Office of the Secretary of State on a registration
form provided by that Office."
117 Id. § 375/1.5(c). eBay is an example of an Internet auction listing web site
in which the initial ticket holder places their tickets into the open market for a
specified period of time, and the highest bidder for the tickets gets to purchase the
tickets for the price they bid on. Ticket sellers must include the ticket's face value
as well as the location of the event.
eBay, Ticket Selling Policies,
http://pages.ebay.com/buyselltickets/sellingpolicies.html
(last visited Mar. 24,
2006). Selling tickets on eBay is perfectly legal and eBay's policies are in
accordance with the various state laws throughout the United States. eBay, Selling
and
Buying
Tickets
on
eBay:
Overview,
http://pages.ebay.com/
buyselltickets/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2006). eBay's policies are based
on where the event is located and not where the buyer and seller are located. eBay,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://pages.ebay.com/buyselltickets/faq.html
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2006). Thus, if a seller in a restricted state wanted to sell tickets
for a baseball game in an unrestricted area such as Chicago, they would not be
subject to any restrictions and could receive as much over face value as possible.
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"an independent and disinterested dispute resolution procedure". 11 8
Next, subsection (d) permits the selling of tickets above face
value at an auction raising money for charitable purposes by or for a
non-profit organization.'"9 Lastly, subsection (e) permits the resale of
tickets above face value through an Internet web site whose operator
has a business with a physical street address in Illinois and 20is in
compliance with all applicable laws in regards to selling tickets.'
The purpose of Section 1.5 of the Ticket Scalping Act is to
carve out specific exceptions to the general rule that prohibits ticket
scalping altogether. Penalties exist for people found selling tickets
above face value who do not meet the explicit requirements exempted
under Section 1.5 of the Act.' 2 1 Individuals convicted in violation of
Section 1.5 are guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and may be
subjected to a fine of up to $5,000 for each offense. 12 2 Violators may
also be required to make restitution payments to each injured
consumer and could forfeit their own right to attend the specified
event. 23 A court may also permanently enjoin an individual or
corporation found guilty of violating Section 1.5 from further
engaging in offering or selling tickets. 124 Finally, an injured party
has the right to bring a civil action against the individual in violation
of this Section and may recover up to $100.125
IV. New Trends in Ticket Scalping: They Couldn't
Beat 'em So They Joined 'em
Seemingly unable to gain ground against the never-ending
existence of ticket scalping, or perhaps simply intrigued by the idea
of excess profits, some entertainment promoters have discreetly put
118

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(c)(4)(B) & (c)(5).

119

Id. § 375/1.5(d).

120 Id. § 375/1.5(e). At first glance, it seems redundant to have subsection (e)
with the existence of subsection (c) already covering Internet web sites. However,
subsection (c) governs Internet auction web sites whereas subsection (e) allows the
ticket reseller to simply list the purchase price of the ticket on his or her web site.
121

Id. § 375/2(a).

122 Id.
123

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/2(a) The scalper in violation of this Section may

also have his or her tickets confiscated without any repayment. Id. § 375/2(b).
124 Id. § 375/2(c).
125

Id. § 375/3.

452

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 18:4

on a new hat and plotted ways to collect additional revenue from
ticket sales. 126 Specifically, with the advent of the Internet and
ongoing advancements in technology-enhancing methods of scalping
tickets, promoters are able to disguise themselves to capitalize on the
secondary ticket market by scalping their own tickets.'17 The legality
behind many of these practices is not only questionable, but ripe to
jeopardize the credibility of the promoters and only further widen the
gap between themselves and the average consumer.
a. The Chicago Cubs
In February 2002, the Tribune Company, owners of the
Chicago Cubs baseball team, incorporated Wrigley Field Premium
Ticket Services ("Premium"), a ticket brokerage firm, "to compete in
the profitable business of brokering Cubs baseball tickets.' 28 On the
surface, Premium, as a registered ticket broker, could lawfully sell
tickets above face value under Section 1.5 of the Illinois Ticket
Scalping Act.129 However, because the Tribune Company owns both
the Cubs and Premium, questions immediately began to surface as to
whether this practice was legal. 130 The Illinois Ticket Scalping Act
explicitly forbids reselling tickets at a price above face value unless
one of the enumerated exceptions apply; 13 and yet this was exactly
what the Cubs appeared to be doing. 32 Furthermore, Premium had a
tremendous competitive advantage over other competing ticket
brokers as it could receive tickets directly from the Cubs' box office
before any tickets were released to the general public and were
therefore not forced to33rely on traditional alternative sources such as
season ticket holders.'

126

Pappas, supra note 33, at 20.

127

Freeman & Gati, supra note 26, at 6.

128

Siporin, supra note 52, at 739.

129

Id. See also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(b).

130

Simon, supra note 22, at 1198

131

Id. See also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(a).
Pappas, supra note 33, at 20.

132

Id. at 20-21. In fact, the existence of Premium actually affected season
ticket holders. Id. at 21. Prior to Premium's incorporation, season ticket holders
were given the opportunity to buy individual tickets to specific games before they
were offered to the general public. Id. While this overall policy did not change in
theory, it was tweaked so that the most high-profile events went directly to
133
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Naturally, the Cubs plan was met with hostility. The existence
of Premium seemed to contradict the Cubs stance of ticket
scalping. 134 Traditionally, the Cubs were against all forms of ticket
scalping. If security reports indicated that a ticket holder was
reselling his or her tickets at an inflated value, the Cubs would send a
letter warning the ticket holder that if the practice did not stop, they
would be in jeopardy of having their seat license revoked. 135 This was
not all talk. The Cubs did indeed go as far as revoking season tickets
of persons found engaging in the practice.' 36 Yet, the existence of
Premium seemed to catapult the Cubs directly into the same
secondary37 market they forbade their season ticket holders from
entering.
Additionally, Major League Baseball became suspjicious of
the Tribune Company's antics and with good reason. 31 Major
League Baseball rules require that each ball club contribute to a
revenue-sharing program by paying thirty-four percent of its local
revenue into a common fund that is later divided equally among all
teams. 139 This program was designed in order to help the teams with
less revenue and who play in'smaller market cities to stay
competitive with the teams from the larger markets. 40 However, the
Cubs were not willing to share any profits they made from Premium
with the rest of the league. 14 1 In 2003, the Cubs reported that because
Premium. Id. Prior to the 2003 individual game sale, the Cubs announced that no
seats were available for the series against the New York Yankees (who were
making their first ever regular season appearance at Wrigley Field), Chicago White
Sox, or the St. Louis Cardinals. Id.
134 Siporin, supra note 52, at 739-40.
135 Solerholm v. Chi. Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. 587 N.E.2d 517, 518
(Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1992).
136 Siporin, supra note 52, at 739-40; see generally Solerholm, 587 N.E.2d at
518. The Cubs revoked all but six of the plaintiffs eighteen season tickets after it
became known that he was engaging in ticket scalping by reselling his tickets at
prices above face value. Id.
137

Siporin, supra note 52, at 739.

138

Pappas, supra note 33, at 21; Simon, supra note 22, at 1198. Premium's

president was a vice president of the Cubs, its office was a block from Wrigley
Field on property leased by the Tribune Company, and its books were kept by the
Cubs' accounting department. Id.
19 Pappas, supra note 33, at 21.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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Premium had not made an overall profit, they did not owe any money
in excess
of their box office sales to the common revenue-sharing
142
fund.

Consumers were so irate with the existence of Premium that a
class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of Cubs fans against the Cubs
alleging that the common ownership that existed between the Cubs
and Premium violated the Illinois Scalping Act. 4 3 The lawsuit was
initiated by two fans who had previously purchased tickets with a
face value of $36 for prices between $50 and $130.144 The lawsuit
alleged that the Cubs, through Premium, had effectively scalped
nearly 12,000 of their own tickets. 45 The suit demanded that
Premium pay a $100 fee for each ticket purchased by consumers, as
provided as a civil remedy under the Act. 146 However, the case was
decided in favor of the Cubs and Premium. 147 The court determined
that all transactions between the two corporations were in fact sales,
that Premium was an independent broker, and that current Illinois law
permits ticket brokering and does not prohibit common ownershi
between an entertainment enterprise and a brokerage firm.
Basically, unless the legislature steps in and intervenes, under current
Illinois law, a sports team may openly scalp tickets under such a
format. 149 The decision of this case is currently'awaiting appeal.
b. The Seattle Mariners
The Cubs are hardly the only team that has generated
additional revenue by reentering their product into the marketplace.
With the advent of the Internet and ever-increasing technology,
online ticket sales have become a lucrative option.' 50 Taking
Id. Needless to say, owners of other baseball clubs were not happy with
the Cubs position on Premium. Id.
143 See Yang, supra note 19, at 115; Cavoto v. Chi. Nat'l League Baseball
Club, Inc., No 02 CH 18372 (I11. Ch. Nov. 24, 2003).
142

144 Yang, supra note 19, at 113.
145 Simon,
146

supra note 22, at 1199.
Yang, supra note 19, at 113.

147

Simon, supra note 22, at 1199.

148

Id. at 1199-2000.

149

Id. at 2000.

150 Hannah R. Short, Implications of Grokster for Online Ticket Sale

Companies: Why Online Ticket Resale Sites Should be Held Liablefor Violating
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advantage of such opportunities, the Seattle Mariners set up an
interactive web site called the Ticket Marketplace.' 5 1 Through this
site, season ticket holders unable to attend a game can sell their
tickets by posting them on the web site for any online consumer to
purchase. There is no limit for how much the ticket holder can sell
through this site are usually sold at a price
for and tickets resold
53
above face value.
The Mariners profit from this interactive marketplace by
charging a ten percent commission for all buyers and a fifteen percent
commission for all sellers using their Marketplace. 154 The team
earned over $100,000 in 2003 through commission prices on Ticket
Marketplace. 55 Additionally, the Mariners began to withhold tickets
typically reserved for sale to fans at the box office to sell directly
through the Ticket Marketplace above face value. 156 Unlike the Cubs,
of the profits to
however, the Mariners give the required percentage
157
plan.
sharing
revenue
Baseball's
League
Major
Although the Mariners are the most recognized example of
this practice, approximately twenty-five other sports franchises
provide similar services through Internet ticket brokers.' 58 The
controversy centers on the hypocrisy of this plan--teams put in
strong initiatives to get rid of the ticket scalper while simultaneously
profiting off of their product by acting in a manner similar to the

State ScalpingLaws, 7 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 181, 191 (2005).
151 Freeman & Gati, supra note 26, at 7.
152

Id.

Id. This is in spite of the fact that a Seattle ordinance forbids the reselling
of tickets above face value. The state of Washington, however, does not have such
a law so as long as the sale does not take place in Seattle, the tickets may be resold
at any price the market bares. Pappas, supra note 33, at 22-23. Yet ticket scalping
does not rank high on the priority of local law enforcement who would rather focus
their resources on issues such as drunk driving and domestic violence than ensuring
compliance with the scalping laws. Id. The team has argued that LiquidSeats, the
technology provider, has the capabilities of blocking sellers who live in Seattle thus
maintaining compliance with the ordinance, however the truth behind this assertion
is suspect. Freeman & Gati, supra note 26, at 7.
154 Pappas, supra note 33, at 22.
153

155

Id.
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Id.
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59
exact type of behavior they are trying to prohibit.'

c. Broadway
Ticket scalping is not just limited to the sporting industry. In
2001, the producers of the hit Broadway show The Producers began
to withhold approximately fifty seats for- each show from the public
until the day of the performance.' 60 They proceeded to sell the
tickets, with a face value of $100, to a brokerage firm they had
created 161 for $400 a piece. 162 The tickets were then marked up to the
legal twenty percent to $480 whereupon they were sold to the
public. 63 The promoters of The Producersprofited so heavily from
this plan that as many as ten other Broadway shows have since
latched onto the idea of
withholding VIP tickets in an attempt to win
164
the "war on scalpers."'

V.

Solutions: How Consumers Can Best Protect
Themselves

Ticket scalping has been in existence both legally and
illegally for well over 100 years and recent changes in Illinois law, as
well as many other states, point to the conclusion that the industry is
a permanent fixture in our society. Yet consumers can begin to
protect themselves merely by becoming knowledgeable of their
state's applicable laws on this matter. Consumers often have remedial
rights afforded to them that they are completely unaware of.
Additionally, consumers should be aware as to whom, if anyone,
legally has the right to scalp tickets. Many states have laws similar to
Illinois in which only certain individuals are allowed to engage in this
practice. 16 5 Currently no federal law exists that deals with this issue,
and although Congress could plausibly regulate this industry, because
the scalping industry varies greatly by state, it is unlikely that they
159 Id.
160

Simon, supra note 22, at 1200.

161

Id. The brokerage firm is called Broadway Inner Circle. Id.

162 Id.
163 Id.

164 Id.
165

(2005).

See, e.g., Ticket Sale & Resale Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/1.5(b)(1)
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will take this power away from the states' elected legislatures.
Consumers dissatisfied with their state's scalping laws can
always lobby their state legislature for changes. This is a distinct
possibility in Illinois, specifically with the court's ruling in Cavoto
effectively permitting promoters to scalp their own tickets. Given that
the promoters have the right to set the initial price of the ticket,
allowing them to enter the secondary market is not only unfair to the
average consumer, but also to the independent legalized ticket broker
to whom such laws were enacted to assist.

VI. Conclusion: The Future of Ticket Scalping
Ticket scalping, while still very prevalent, is certainly not
what it used to be. Instead of the stereotypical ticket scalper holding
an abundance of tickets above his or her head risking arrest in order
'to make a profit, most ticket scalping occurs behind the scenes, on
Internet auction sites or through registered ticket brokers. State laws
and local ordinances vary, making it difficult to keep the different
laws straight, let alone attempt to punish any wrongdoers. The
majority of statutes dealing with scalping allow the practice in some
form, making it even more difficult to effectively enforce such laws.
Yet, what is the price of enforcement? As technology
continues to grow, ticket scalping schemes become more complex, so
much so that some promoters have begun scalping their own tickets.
The ticket scalper illegally selling near the venue is easy to catch; yet
those scalpers are few and far between. Combating this enterprise on
a widespread level is impractical, if not downright foolish. The
resources necessary to catch the majority of these enterprises would
be astronomical. Therefore, the majority of resources used to fight
this practice should be geared more towards prohibiting the promoter
from entering the secondary market. These practices would not be as
difficult to catch and would have the effect of alleviating at least
some of the existing tension between producers and consumers.

